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UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW

VOLUME 2,_N UMBER 3

Gordon Thompson esq., grandson
of two judges, is a prominent trial
attorney in San Diego.

THE ADOPTION
DILEMMA

Some months ago, a distraught
couple enter ed my office, informing
me that the adoption agency who
had placed a child with them for
adoption after many months of
their being investigated, had retrieved the child from the home of
the deceived couple who stood b efore me. This act of the adoption
agency was pursuant to an agreement which the prospective adoptive parents sign at the time that
they receive the child. In part
this agreement reads as follows:
"The Agency has the legal right to
remove the child prior to legal
adoption if, in the judgment of the
Agency, such action will serve the
best interest of the child. . . The
adopting parents agree to return
the child to the Agency immediately
if such action is deemed necessary
b y the Agency."
Pursuant to this agreement, the
young and somewhat bewildered
couple had advised me that they
had returned the child to the
Agency thinking that they were
required to do so pursuant to the
agreement which they signed with
the Adoption Agency. They continued to state that they were not
aware of the reasons why the
Agency retrieved the ch ii d from
their home and that they could not,
after due diligence, determine those
reasons. They sought my advice
as to whether or not, under the
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aforementioned facts, they could
file a petition for adoption on the
child which was not in their home
at this time due to its removal by
the Adoption Agency, which not
only originally placed the child in
their home, but which did so after
a complete screening of this prospective a doptive couple.
Faced with this dilemma, as to
the rights of this couple, the Civil
Code of the St ate of California
would afford what on its face would
appear to be ready answer to the
above-stated question. Section
224n of the Civil Code provides:
"The agency to which a child has
been r elinquished for adoption
shall be responsible for the care of
the child, and shall be entitled to
the custody and control of child
at all times u n ti 11 a petition for
adoption has been granted. Any
placement for temporary care, or
for adoption made by the agency,
may be terminated at the discretion
of the agency at any time prior to
the granting of a petition for adoption. In the event of termination of
any placement for temporary care
or for adoption, the child shall be
returned promptly to the physical
custody of the agency. No petition
may be filed to a dopt a child relinquished to a licenced adoption
agency except by the prospective
adoptive parents with whom the
child has been placed for adoption
by the adoption agency.
After
the petition for adoption h as been
filed, the agency may remove the
child from the prospective a doptive parents only with the approval
of the Court, upon motion by the
agency after notice to the prospective adoptive parents , supported
by an affidavit or affidavits stating
the grounds on which removal is
sought. If an agency refuses to
consent to the adoption of a child
by the person or persons with
whom the agency placed the child
for adoption, the Superior Court
may nevertheless decree the adoption if it finds that the refusal to
consent is not in the best interest
of the child."
One cannot help but escape the
conclusion that the aforestated Section of the Civil Code is not clear.
It is ambiguous, for it fails to

spell out what power and authority
the agency may have with respect
to the removal of the child, but
with respect to the effect of the removal on the right of the then
adoptive parents to file a petition
for adoption.
It, therefore, becomes a question
of statutory construction and legislative intent. Does this statute, so
inartistically drawn, define who are
prospective adoptive parents? Does
this statute prevent petitioners from
filing a petition for adoption on a
child not in their home, but removed by the agency? If the
agency, after removal, had placed
the child with another adoptive
couple, which of these two couples
would be prospective adoptive parents under this Section. Does the
agency have an absolute right to
dictate who shall not adopt children, or is that reserved to the
Superior Cour's jurisdiction, along
with who shall adopt children?
To the best of my ability, I shall
attempt to answer these questions.
First, it must be kept in mind
that statutes relating to adoptions
are in derogation of the common
law, and the rule of strict construction does not apply. Civil
Code Section 4 dearly states: "The
rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The code establishes the law of this State respecting the subjects to which it rela tes,
and its provisions are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
its objects and to promote justice."
Bearing in mind, there are two
purposes of the law of adoption:
( 1) As stated in the case of Adoption of lvkDonald 43 Cal. 2d 447
at 449 "The main purpose of adoption is the promotion of the welfare
of children bereft of the benefits of
a home and care of their real parents." Secondly, what society has
conceived it to be in its interest to
meet the human longing for children of those who for whatever
physical or other fortuitous circumstances cannot have children,
or have for some reason been unable to conceive children of their
own. Needless to say, one finds
(continu ed on page 4)

DEAN NAMED TO POST

Joseph A. Sinclitico Jr., dean of
the School of Law, recently accepted an appointment to the American
Bar Association Special Committee
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appointment was made
by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President
of the American Bar Association.
Brig. Gen. Franklin Riter of Salt
Lake City, Utah, is the Chairman.
The committee held its first meeting
in New Orleans February 5, 6, and
7th. Prior to his appointment as
Dean of the Law School, Dean
Sinclitico had been professor of
Federal Civil Procedure at the
School of Law for the past five
years.

Witkin Speaks

In early March, Bernard E.
Witkin, noted speaker and writer
on California Law spoke on the
University of San Diego campus.
In an a ddress attended by faculty
and students, he discussed a series
of anomalies in modern criminal
law, which allow technicalities to
free an obviously guilty defendant.
Lashing out at what he termed
"constitutional cliches, "Witkin presented for consideration several
cases of note wherein he asserts
defendants were freed on grounds
which unjustly superseded their
admitted or o bvious guilt. Mere
constitutional technicalities he feels
to be stumbling blocks in the way
of justice.
Witkin is no st r a ng er to the
U.S.D. campus. Last year he addressed students and faculty,
choosing as his topic the "Constitutional Right to be Wrong. "

Editorial

TWO WRONGS
NEVER MAKE A RIGHT
The recent administrative action
concerning the pilfering of books
from our library reminds us of a
story of a little town in Magenta.
It seems that grave robbers were
deleting the town's cemetary's supply of bodies. The founding fathers got together and decided to
prevent any further reoccurrences.
They gathered up all the bodies
and put them all in one huge tomb.
This ended the base acts of the
thieves, but the cemetary went
bankrupt for want of patrons.
We, of course, do not mean to
infer that books are easier to come
by than bodies. . . but we do mean
to say that two wrongs never make
a right or solve the problem.
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RESPECT
AND ALL THAT JAZZ
What is a school? Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary defines
the term as "An institution for
teaching ... any place or means of
learning or discipline ... a faculty
for specialized higher education
usually within a university; as a
medical or law school." The concept of a school then necessarily
includes two elements, teachers and
students. But the inquiry sho uld
not stop here.
A "student" is defined by the same
source as a "learner, scholar, especially one who attends a school."
A " teacher" is" .. . one who teaches
or instructs, an. instructor." And,
in the particular case of our school,
a "professor" is one who "teaches
or professes special knowledge in
any art or occupation requiring
skill, one on whom the title has
been formally conferred."
A teacher then, is a teacher because of his special knowledge and
experience in the subject taught.
The student is the learner by reason of his lack of such knowledge
and experience, i.e., by reason of
his ignorance.
It would indeed be a strange
paradox to find a school in which
the students knew more than the
teachers.
In fact, could such a
situation be termed a school at
all? Fortunately, we are not faced
with that problem here at the
School of Law, despite the fact
that some students profess to know
more than the professors.
We have an outstanding faculty
here at the School of Law, as
evidenced by the respective diversified backgrounds and degrees of

each professor. Those among us
who are inclined to think that they
know more than any professor,
are professing only their own ignorance, and are kidding no one
but themselves.
A very small passage from a
very small book might well be
appropriate for all of us to bear
in mind:
•Be not therefore puffed up with
any art or science, but rather fear
on account of the knowledge which
has been given you.
If it seem to you that you know
many things and understand them
well, know at the same time that
there are many more things of
which you are ignorant.
B e not high-minded, but rather
acknowledge yo ur ignorance.
Why would you prefer yo urself to
others when there are many more
learned and skilled in the law than
yourself?
T o have no opinion of ourselves
and to think always well and highly of others is great wisdom and
high perfection.
We are all frail, but think no
one more frail than yourself "
The Imitation of Christ
Book I, Chapter II
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President's
Message
BILL BLANK, PRE SIDENT

One of education's oldest maxims
is that one 1earns from his own
mistakes- a fine principal if in
fact one knows what his mistakes
are. Unfortunately there is no such
guarantee, and law school is frequently an example.
One of law school's most frustrating problems is presented when
one walks out of an examination
with full confidence in having done
well only to later receive a low
grade. At this point comes an inevitable, melancholy question:
What went wrong?
True, there are some piecemeal
remedies for the student who would
like to improve by building on his
own errors. Some professors will
review poorer papers with thei r
writers, while others will try to
cover the exam for the whole class
at the start of the new semester.
Others merely state, with ostensible
justification, "No one reviewed my
exams with me when I was in law
school." Whatever the case, the
average student-the borderline
bar type- seldom really discovers
what his errors are, and poorer
students often fail without knowing
exactly why. Even top students
are heard to express bewilderment
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STUDENT BAR LUNCHEON

"Within two hundred years the practice of law as we know it may be
dead". Thus climaxed the address given by the Honorable John F.
Martin, Judge Presiding of the San Diego Municipal Court, at a Student
Bar Luncheon on the University Campus.
Judge Martin quickly pointed out that if indeed the practice faces
a threat, it is from the reluctance of practitioners to exercise initiative
in the solution of human problems. Relating this to the key point of
his speech, the judge dealt specifically with one area in which, as he
points out, the bench and bar have both been unfortunately lax, i.e. ,
the handling of the indigent accused.
In a gathering composed of students, U. S. D. Law Professors, and
the entire California District Court of Appeals of San Diego, Judge
Martin both praised and prompted the local bar association. It is hard
to assess the real meaning of the vast changes around us today, he
asserted, but in the spectacular light of Gideon v. Wainright, we see one
of them in clearing dimensions. To date, the San Diego Bar Association
has been extremely helpful, the judge asserted, and he praised the area's
practicing attorneys for their ready efforts toward aiding the indigent in
felony cases. Equally important, and regrettably unsolved, is the problem of the indigent accused of a misdemeanor. This, he felt, deserves
immediate attention.
The danger, he revealed, is the specter of another public agency
being raised to handle the problem if and when private efforts fail to
materialize. If attorneys can alert themselves to the preemptive solution,
they will have struck a blow for private handling of public problems.
If not, most certainly the public will ultimately turn their attention toward a solution. An example of such a happening was cited by the
judge: the well-known "Manhatten Bail Project," which, he points out,
has cast a shadow over the San Diego area. Here public agencies are
being proposed to handle bail for the indigent when the problem might
well have been competently h andled by attorneys, had they concerned
themselves more deeply at an earlier date.
The question posed by Judge Martin is simply this: Do we really
need such agencies? A full investigation should be followed through by
both members of bench and bar to find the answer.
at some of their grades. From
this unpleasant situation a student
often turns to the "post mortem"
with his classmates in an effort to
guess what really are the lesso ns to
be learned from the experience. As
often as not he is only further led
astray by the group's cumulative
error. At best disagreements are
as many as there are students in
the discussion, with no real authority to turn to the resolution.
There is no doubt our faculty
is continually striving to improve
our school, better prepare students
for the practice of law, and raise
our bar results. But recent bar
results have shown students failing, often by very slim margins,

and one must inevitably ask what
percentage of this group might
have made the hurdle if they had
been given the additional boost
of some post-exam guidance.
Many years ago the adoption of
the case-book method of study attested to the foresight of those who
realized one learns best by doing,
by attacking a problem on his own
and thereby generalizing rules by
which law itselfmaybeconstructed.
To be sure, this principle may be
sound enough for study, but when
the time comes for an evaluation
of that study, the student is little
aided by the mere showing of an
unexplained grade, leaving him to
(continued on page 3)

President's Message (cont. from pg . 2)

evaluate what he has already put
his utmost into.
After exams there is often no way
to get any meaningful critique from
the professor. Especially is this
a problem after the Spring Semester. And if, as has been proposed,
the school adopts yearly examinations, there will be even less
opportunity for discovery of one's
errors.
Practice exams given the first
year students in their first semester
are very helpful, but of course all
questions cannot then be answered.
Since bar-type questions are given
it is not unlikely that the student
will later see similar problems on
the b ar examination, and the help
a careful evaluation would give
him in law school can obviously
be translated into b etter performance on the bar, as at lease the
student will have had a n opportunity to recognize specific errors
and guard against their recurrence.
The Student Bar is not yet committed to an answer to the above
problem, but surely every member
will welcome any steps which will
improve his performance. Presently the Student Bar is surveying
other law schools to find if any
solutions to the problem are in
practice on other camp uses. Suggestions from local students have
included the following:
1. Model answers
2. Listing of issues raised in the
question
3. An outline of the question
4. A general approach to answering the question
5. A simple check list for weak
areas and common errors
6. Reproduction of the best answers turned in
True, such a system might impose an extra burden on the faculty;
but if a student is expected to answer a question in an hour, a professor should be able, having both
written the question and read num ero us answers, to duplicate the
feat or surpass it, time-wise. And
in fact such a system might lessen
the teacher's load, freeing him from
many of the repetitious personal
visits from students.
Most important, we are not asking the faculty to justify their evaluation of the student, only to guide
him in arriving at legal schol arship. The simple expedient of
mimeographing some sort of aid
and mailing it to a student with his
grade might well pay off handsomely when it is the school's turn
to be eval u ated, through bar
results, in the eyes of a critical and
expectant profession.

IBM& The law

Since last October, San Diego
County has maintained its attorneys' civil calendar by harnessing its' wealth of IBM tabulator
equipment so as to afford an almost completely mechanical process of case handling from the
filing of the memorandum to set
trial, until the case is actually disposed of by settlement or hearing.
The tabulator process, while
seemingly a most intricate system,
is in reality easily understood by
even a novice in legal clerical work.
As explained by Betty Elwell, Master Calendar Clerk at the County
Courthouse, the underlying motive
of the tabulator method is maximum efficiency in setting up the
trial calendar by avoiding attorney duplication andconsequentsetbacks and continuances.
After the memorandum of setting
is filed in the civil division of the
County Clerk's office it is sent to
the Master Calendar Division
where it is assigned a consecutive
civil active numb er. A setting slip,
consisting of all pertinent information, is made up from the memorandum and attorneys are assigned
an IBM identity number which
corresponds to that which has been
placed on the memor andum of setting. The setting slip is then sent
to Data Processing section and the
information punched into cards.
At such time as the settlement or
pre-trial hearings are set, this information also is sent to Data
Processing, where the original IBM
cards are pulled from the file s, the
information added, and the appropriate forms printed and sent.
Every attorney having a case
pending is given an IBM number.
When a case is due for hearing,
the attorney's number is checked
on the IBM wo rksheets , to verify
that he is not previously committed
during the proposed time of he aring. If either a ttorney is prescheduled, then the case is set back
to the earliest possible time that is
convenient to all parties, and the
next case inserted in its place.
The advantages of using IBM
machines in setting up the attorney
calendar are many and varied.
It is a faster method, a great
clerical work-saver, and affords
little if any opportunity for error.
In the words of Robert B. James,
County Clerk, "Its biggest a dv a ntage is in avoiding the greatest
hazard of a co ngested court calendar, that is, placing unwary counsel in two or more places at the
{continued on pag e 4)
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Frat Elections

Election returns for the various
offices in the Wigmore Inn Chapter
of Phi Delta Phi have been announced. In a release of results on
the 15th of February, Wes Harris,
Ex-Magister of Wigmore Inn, reported that for the fall semester of
1965, Bob Mitinger will be Magister, and for the spring semester
the office will be held by Elbert

J. Boone. Other offices filled included Exchequer won by Edward
Reading, Clerk Charles Jones, and
Historian, Paul McEwen.
On the 20th of February, McCormick Chapter of Phi Alpha Delta
announded that the new Justice
will be Robert Banta.
Office of
Vice-Justice will be filled by Andre
Fortier. Both are second year day
students.

ADOPTION (cont. from page 1)

little, if anything, in the cases relative to the second consideration
and, in fact, the case law on this
point is very limited. We do know
that in the Adoption of Backhaus
209 Cal. App. 2d 13, the Court
there held that one who did not
have the child presently in their
possession could file a petition for
adoption, and thus, did invoke
action of the Court.
While it is conceded that no precedent can be found which furnishes
a ready answer to the problem of
statutory construction of Section
224n of the Civil Code, there are
authorities which, while not directly in point, furnish guidance
toward a resolution thereof. They
are as follows:
( 1) Pursuant to Civil Code Section
4 , the statutory construction of Civil Code Section 224n should be a
liberal construction. (2) As Stated
in 1 Am Jur. 1963 Cumulative
Supplement to Vol. 1 at pg. 192,
"All adoption laws and statutes in
pari materia therewith should be
read together as constituting one
law." Thus, 224n must be read
with 221 and 226 of the Civil
Code. (3) As stated by the Court
in Adoption of Graham, 58 Cal.
2d 899 at 907 and Adoption of
Barnet, 54 Cal. 2d 370 at 337 to
378, the question here is fundamentally one of adoptive procedures, and the legislature has provided extensive provisions therefor.
Such provisions must be construed
with a view of accomplishing their
purpose. ( 4) Whenever possible,
such a construction should be given
adoption laws as will sustain,
rather than defeat, the object they
have in view; (Estate of McKeag
141 Cal. 403) and (5) The main
purpose of the adoption statute is
the promotion of the welfare of
children, bereft of the benefits of
the home and care of their real
parents, by the legal recognition
and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable
counterpart of the relationship of
the parent and child. (InreSantos,
185 Cal. 127)
Based upon these five guideposts
and applying them to the statutory
construction to be given to Section
224n, it is readily apparent that
in order for a petition for adoption
to be filed on any child relinquished to an agency, said petition for
adoption must be filed by the prospective adoptive parents, that is,
by the parents with whom the child
has been placed for adoption. On
the other hand, it is equally clear
that under a liberal construction of
224n, any prospective adoptive
parents can file a petition for adop-

THE COURTEOUS VICTIM
People v. Peckham, 232 A. C. A. 227, February 1965
Appellant was convicted in a non-jury trial of violating Penal Code
section 220: assault with intent to commit rape. The crime charged is
established when the prosecution proves that the defendant intended to
have sexual intercourse with his victim, and to use force to overcome
her resistance. Appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient
to establish his use of force and violence. The victim testified that
she asked appellant if he needed "any assistance." According to her
testimony, she felt that if defendant had satisfied his desires, she would
be able to get free. The court held that the "utmost exertion is not
required." That when the victim determines that her opposition has been
carried to the point where further opposition would imperil her life
or safety, the trial court must then determine only whether her fears
Judgment was reversed, but 'on other
were reasonably grounded.
grounds.

*****

THE VANISHING BARRISTER
Arthur v. Superior Ct. L.A. County, 42 Cal Rptr 441 , :March 1965
This was a case where counsel was absent from the court room when
he was required to appear. The Supreme Court took judicial notice
that elusive attorneys are a recurring problem in the trial courts.

* ****

WHAT'S THE HURRY
McKinney v. State Bar, 62 A. C. 197, January 1965
Disbarment of an attorney, when it appeared that the attorney over
a long period of time had failed to meet the high standards demanded
of members of the legal profession. The attorney in question had on
previous occasions mishandled client's funds, and in the present action
had forged his client's name and fabricated a loan agreement in order
to use his client's settlement proceeds.

*****

THE TRUTH IS FINALLY A DEFENSE
People v. Nigri 232 A C. A 419
Defendant was indicted and convicted of the crime of Statutory
Rape. At a preliminary proceeding the judge over a general objection
allowed evidence that the prosecuting witness had told defendant that
she was eighteen years old, (hence above the age of consent,) for such
benefit as it might furnish the defendant at the time of his probation
and sentence hearing. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in People v.
Hernandez 61 Cal 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P2d 673, (July
1964), completely changed the law pertaining to Statutory Rape by
holding that in such a case the defendant's reasonable belief that the
female was above the age of consent constituted a valid defense. Defendant appealed seeking a new trial in order that he might present
evidence of his reasonable belief as to the girl's age. HELD: New
Trial granted. Defendant was entitled to a new trial, even though he had
made no offer in the trial court to present such evidence.
IBM & The Law

(cont. from page 3)

same time-obviously a task which
even the most able of attorneys
would find most difficult if not quite
impossible. Also, the system eliminates any possibility of prejudice
in setting the calendar, for the
machine neither knows nor favors
anyone."
Although every county in the
state of California has tabulator
equipment, as yet, San Diego
county is the only one to make
use of its IBM machines in this
fashion. However, many of the
counties have inquired of San
Diego as to various phases of the
program and as Mr. James remarked, "Most probably, it will

only be a short time before many
counties follow San Diego's lead
and adopt the IBM attorney calendar system."

JUDGE RULED OUT

Municipal Court Judge Robert
Conners was all set to try Delton
Pardue on charges of assault and
disturbing the peace filed by his
wife.
Pardue cried foul.
"You married me," he told the
judge. "You got me into this, and
I want somebody else to get me
out."
The judge withdrew from the
case.
4

tion at any time after the child has
been placed with them and while
the child still remains in their home.
Any provision or regulation of the
agency to the contrary would, it
would seem, be ineffective as would
any agreement requiring such prospective adoptive parents to in any
way delay their filing of a petition
for adoption.
This then leave the final question
of what happens when the child
has been removed by the agency
and placed with the second couple
for adoption. What effect, if any,
did the removal have on the petitioners right to file for adoption?
224n makes it clear that the child
may be removed by the agency
who placed the child. That agency's attempt to remove the child
after a petition is filed is subject
to the Court's approv al. That removal after the petition is flied
does not divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to decide the adoption,
and whether the child has been removed from the home or not, the
agency may still refuse to give its
consent to the adoption. Now, in
none of these instances , is the
Court's ultimate jurisdiction to decree an adoption lost. The legislature clearly set forth its intention
to vest in the Court the ultimate
decision with respect to adoption,
and not in the agency, as stated
in the last sentence of Section 224n
of the Civil Code. This, in the final
(co ntinued an page 6)

U.S.D. MANGLES CAL WESTERN
Before one hundred screaming
fans at Cal Western's Golden Gym,
the U.S.D. Law School Basketball
Team slaughtered the Cal Western
contingent 71- 51. This was the
second time in two years that the
U.S.D. "five" has walked away
from the Cal Western Boys.
Led by Bob "the Bruiser" Mitinger, who shoved in fifteen points,
"Terrible" Tom Salvino, who
flipped in sixteen points, and Jack
"the Giant" McCabe who dropped
in fifteen more points, "the unholy
fiv e"was never in trouble.
Coaches Frank "Bills and Notes"
Engfelt and !µchard "Future Interests" Kelly, screaming Latin
maxims from the sidelines, stirred
"Bomber" Phil Altfest, Mickey
"mighty mouse" Bruce, and"Jumpin" Jim Rucker on to stellar defensive play.
Backing up the front line boys
were Mike Welch, Richard Townsend and Ed Sada.
According to Assistant Coach
Jim "bottoms" Miranti, the"unholy
five" will accept challenges from
any recognized Law School.

THE UNIVERSITY SHIELD
This is the time of year when class rings and diplomas are in the
foreground. And, on every class ring, on every diploma, and on every
bulletin published at the University, will appear the University Shield.
We, the editors, thought it would be of some interest both to students
and faculty to discuss the meaning of this symbol.
The University Shield h as impressive significance. Its depth of
meaning complements the Coat of Arms of His Excellency, the Most
Reverend Charles F. Buddy, Bishop of San Diego, founder, and first
President and Chancellor of the University of San Diego. Above this
article, the reader will note from left to right, The Bishop's Coat of
Arms , the Diocessen Coat of Arms, and the University Shield.
The Bishop's Arms is divided into two parts; the left half refers to
the Diocese of San Diego. The half impaled on the right relates to the
first Bishop of San Diego, i.e. , his personal arms. The Diocessen Arms,
set forth above in the center, is exactly the same as the left side of the
Bishop's Arms. The Diocessen Arms, is the official seal of the Catholic
Diocese of San Diego, more accurately, The Roman Catholic Bishop
of San Diego, A Corporation Sole.
Turning now to the University Shield, it will at once be noted that
much of the symbols contained therein are taken directly from both sides
~ the Bis.!::_op's Arms.
At the top of the Shield is the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove,
just as He hovers over the University imparting his gifts of wisdom
and knowledge. The Shield is divided by a cross, as is the left side of
the Bishop's arms. This symbolizes the cross of our faith. The color
is red signifying the color of blood, the blood Christ shed on the Cross.
In the center of the cross is impaled a lamp, the lamp of wisdom, whose
light we all have occasion to seek.
In the upper left hand corner of the Shield appears a smaller shield
composed of six horozontal stripes of alternating red and green. This

WITKIN IMPRESSES

judges and lawyers-with comprehensive coverage,
critical analysis, lucid style.
Mr. B. E . Witkin has been the outstanding writer and commentator on the law of California for three decades.
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BENDER-MOSS COMPANY

315 Brannan Street, San Francisco, California
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corresponds to the field or background on the personal side of the
Bishop's Arms.
These stripes composed the field on the Borromeo
Arms (St. Charles Borromeo) being the Bishop's baptismal patron and
also the patron of his father.
In the lower left hand corner of the Shield is placed a black pot,
corresponding to the one in the upper left hand corner of the Diocessen
Arms. In Iconography, (representation by symbols,) the usual symbol
of San Diego (Saint Didacus) is the Spanish olla or stew-pot, to indicate
his boundless charity; the Saint having often denied himself food in order to feed the poor and hungry. St. Didacus had a special devotion
to the Passion of Our Lord, and died repeating the chant: "Dulce lignum,
dulce ferrum, dulce pondus sustinet. - Sweetest wood, sweetest iron, sweetest weight is hung on thee." (Pange Lingua) This characteristic of the
Saint is symbolized by the three nails of the Passion which appear on
the lower right hand side of the University Shield, and on the Diocessen
side of the Bishop's Arms.
In the upper right hand corner of the University Shield is a green
shield with a golden rampant lion. This was the Coat of Arms of the
Bishop's family on his mother's side. Though the original appears on
the Shield, it has been abbreviated to a gold lion's head on the Bishop's
personal Arms.
Above the Shield is the motto "Emitte Spiritum Tuum"-(Send Forth
Thy Spirit,) taken from the 30th verse of the 103rd Psalm. As in the
symbol of the Dove, we invoke the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity
for the gifts of wisdom and knowledge, and it is only fitting that we turn
to him for His enlightenment as we invoke Him in courage.
Indeed, the University Shield is rich with vivid symbolism, and is
truly one of the most beautiful that any University could boast.

CASE LOST BY EX-DANCER
A former dancer has lost a
$175,000 suit for personal damages in which she acted as her
own attorney.
Mrs. Bliss Stribling of 4015 S.
Hempstead Circle, filed the suit
against
Dr.
Bernard
Goff,
owner of a parking lot at Fourth
and Washington Streets, where she
said she fell on Dec. 30, 1962.

great-grandMrs. Stribling,
daughter of the late showman and
circus founder, Phineas T. Barnum,
claimed the doctor did not keep
the parking lot in safe condition
and thereby caused her permanent
injuries.
She told the court she had tried
unsuccessfully to get a lawyer to
try the case and was unable to do
so.

Dicta
The award for the most scintillating and thought provoking question
in class this month goes to Al Couie for his brilliant question in General
Hermle's Evidence class. Al, after a lengthy discussion by the General
in explanation of one of the cases in the book assigned for that day,
quietly raised his hand and asked the General to give the citation on
that case ... The award for the most outstanding contribution toward
the development of new law this month goes to Grantt Richardson for
his ingenious theory of Contributory Nuisance as propounded in Professor Brock's Equity class ... By the way, bets are now being taken
by your student Rep's as to whether or not the second year day class
will finish the Equity book. Present odds, 5-1 against. .. Bets a re also
being taken on the completion of the Corporations book. Odds at
present 10-1 in favor, plus half of the cases in Cal. App . .. u· has been
increasingly ·noticable that Ken Wood, verbose by nature, never seems
to say much in the Evidence class. Por que?
NOTE BENE: The official location for congregating and discussing
deep facets of the law, has been changed from the D. M. to the Body
Shop. It must be those topless beers . .. We hear that the poll tax at
P. A D. 's election meeting was the highest in history. It seems Al
Rosen found a by-law "a la Reynolds" whereby the opponents had to
pay some $100.00 in uncollected dues before they could vote themselves
in office... Speaking of fraternities, what is all this about blackballing???
. . . ask the first year day class.
For tho se not aware of the new face lifting of the Jaw school, permit
us to call to your attention the new desks in room lA on the second
floor. This is just the beginning. Plans include changing the student
Bar office into a classroom, making a store room and offices for new
faculty members out of room 2C, second floor , and remodeling the
front admissions office. What is to become of the student bar office???
As for the movies currently playi ng, the editors of this publication
have reviewed "Seance on a Wet Afternoon" and given it a rating of
Cl / 2 which is as follows: "Cl/ 2 Movies although morally unobjectionable ill. _part are in need oJ some explanation to the adulLm.in.Q. Half
understandable, and half incoherent, as unintelligible as "Common Law,"
and which leaves us wondering if movies really are "better than ever."
"The Pumpkin Eater" is placed in the same category. Objectively speaking, if your intelligence quotient is 135 or better, then this movie is for
you , it is co mparable to a U. C. C. Bills and Notes problem involving
Constitutional Law in a Justice of the Peace Court with an opinion
written by Maitland. If your quotient is under 135, we then recommend
"Mary Popins" which we placed on the Bl/ 4.5 list, NOT CONDEMMED
IN PART FOR ALL. . Next month your editors will review "Murder
Ahoy'' with Margaret Rutherford which is expected to pull a Al/2 8*3
rating which is, "Excellent in part for Bachelors, Old Maids, and Mongoloid Idiots, and Objectionable in part for the blind, sex offenders, and
white slave traders."
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ADOPTION (cont. from page 4)
analysis, gives the Court the final
say in matters of adoptions based
upon the best interests of the child.
This is so whether the child is removed or not removed from the
home by the agency, for the removal is not the criteria , but
rather the legislative intention that
the Court shall act as the final
word in the matter.
Provisions for removal, therefore, mean only that the agency
believes at the time of the removal
that the best interests of the child
will b e served by his removal; for
the statute charges them with that
responsibility. Nowhere does the
statute give the agency the absolute right to determine who shall
and who shall not adopt. Therefore, the removal of the child from
the home by the agency, which,
in effect, if one were not allowed to
file a petition for adoption on such
a child, would give the agency the
absolute right to determine who
shall not adopt. The right to remove given to the agency by the
legislature means simply that, and
precisely that, and in the absence
of a greater power and purpose
expressly stated by the legislature,
it should mean no more, for the
legislature has vested the further
determination of the child's best
interestsl n the Court.
To interpret the code to mean
that the removal before the filing
of a petition precludes the right to
file a petition is to give the agency
the power to decree the denial of
an adoption to people who have
invested their lives in a child without the right to have the Court
review the soundness and fairness
of that decision. It is within the
province of the legislature to do
this. Adoption is a statutory institution. The legislature, and not
the Courts, creates the right and it
prescribes the procedure from its
accomplishment. However, the law
of this State is so clear that it does
not lend itself to argument that the
ultimate decision in the matter of
adoption is with the Court. For,
where a statute is subject to an
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interpretation that on the one hand
the Court appears to have jurisdiction and on the other it appears
that it does not, a proper construction is always to acknowledge judicial jurisdiction.
Based upon the foregoing, 224n
must be given a liberal construction. It must be read in connection
with the other Sections, and with a
view of accomplishing the purpose
of the laws of adoption and with a
view which will sustain rather than
defeat the object of adoption, to wit,
the promotion of the welfare of children whose adoptive parents open
their hearts and homes to the unwanted children of our land. As a
proper construction indicates the
adoption agency has the right of
removal, if allowed to remove,
while the Court the right of determination as to who shall and shall
not adopt children, and any agreement of the agency to the contrary
not withstanding. It is, therefore,
suggested by this writer that the
prospective adoptive parents of agency adoptions be aware of the
respective rights of the agency and
of themselves, and of the respective duties of the agency and of
themselves. The real answer to the
problem is that until such time as
the legislature has seen fit to amend
Section 224n of the Civil Code, no
adppti.ve parents, _whetheJ:-.he ha~
signed an agency agreement or not,
should relinquish any child to the
agency or allow that child to be removed by the agency, and should
upon being informed of the possibility of removal by the agency,
immediately fi 1e a petition for
adoption with the Superior Court.
The reason for this is that once the
child is remo ved and placed with
another adoptive couple, the likelihood of the first adoptive couple
ever reacquiring that child through
a petition for adoption or otherwise,
is practically nil, for the sheer passage of time may defeat any and
all rights once acquired by the
first couple having had the child
in their home for a period of time.
The dilemma of the agency adoption.
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